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* Doutoranda em Filosofia na UNIVERSIDADE DE QUEENSLAND,
AUSTRÁLIA, onde relê o projeto ético-político spinozano à luz
do conceito de educação: educação da imaginação, educação
do desejo.
1 The following abbreviated notation will be used when referring
to Spinoza’s Ethics: EI (II, III, IV, V) for Ethics, Part I (Roman
numerals refer to the Parts of  the Ethics); A for axiom; C for
corollary; D for demonstration (or definition if  followed by an
Arabic numeral); L for lemma; Post. for postulate; P for
proposition; Pref. for preface; S for scholium (Arabic numerals
denote the lemma, proposition or scholium number); and, Ap
for appendix. Citations from the Ethics and from Spinoza’s
correspondence are quoted from The Ethics and other works. A
Spinoza Reader. Edited and translated by Edwin Curley; New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.
2 Substance for Spinoza is not defined in Aristotelian terms as
individuals (in the case of  primary substances) or species
(secondary substances), or as in Descartes for whom mind and
matter are also substances. For Spinoza, substance is “what is in
itself  and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept
does not require the concept of  another thing, from which it
must be formed” (EI D3). In this sense, there is only one
substance, that is, God or Nature.
INTRODUCTION
The notion of  individuality is central to Spinoza’sphilosophy 1. This centrality can be firstly
explained, on a general ontological register, by the idea
that actual existence is organised in the form of
individuals. Nothing transcends or underlies the
multiplicity of  individuals. Substance2, identified as
God or Nature, is nothing but the infinite process of
production of  multiple individuals, whereas individuals,
being all causally dependent and thus related, are the
necessary existence of  substance. In other words, the
multiplicity of  individuals and the unity of  substance
are reciprocal. Secondly, the concept of  the individual
figures as crucial in Spinoza’s thought for the essential
elements it provides to our understanding of  his ethical
project. Different interpretations of  Spinoza’s ethics
partly reflect different understandings of  his notion
of  individuality. Those who read Spinoza as promoting
an atomic view of  individuality, for instance, generally
explicate his ethical model in egoistic or individualistic
terms. Conversely, interpretive orientations that focus
on the expansion of  corporeal and mental boundaries
conceive his ethics as a relational process in which the
formation of  more composite individuals does not
preclude the expression and development of  the
individual’s striving for self-determination.
This article’s main objective is to present
distinct interpretations of  Spinoza’s theory of
individuality and to demonstrate how Spinoza’s
ontology can be partially elucidated if  investigated in
close association with his epistemology. Since Spinoza
conceives the individual as a union of  body and mind3,
both the physical and the mental constituent aspects
of  individuality will be examined here. The Spinozist
notion of  body is our starting point: in defining the
body as a conjunction of  parts organised under a
characteristic proportion of  motion and rest4 which
is dependent on exchanges with other bodies in order
to exist 5, Spinoza asserts the constitutive relationality
of  bodies. The expansiveness of  individual boundaries
as an idea that derives from the focus on the defining
relational aspects of bodies is then explored through
Spinoza’s comments on the difference between part
and whole 6, but also through the notion of the
“inorganic body” (Collier, 2002), which is followed by
a discussion concerning whether the political state can
be regarded as a genuine individual (Matheron, 1988;
Barbone, 2001). To the discussion based on more
3 “The mind and the body are one and the same individual,
which is conceived now under the attribute of  thought, now
under the attribute of  extension” (EII P21 S). For Spinoza,
since mind and body are modes of a single substance rather
than distinct mental and material substances, there can be no
causal interaction between them. This idea conveys his thesis
of  parallelism. The correspondence between mind and body is
also asserted by the following passages: “The object of  the idea
constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of
extension which actually exists, and nothing else” (EII P13);
and “the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the
same thing” (EII P21 S).
4 EII P13 A2 L1.
5 EII P13 Post. 4.
6 Letter 32.
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physicalist interpretations, epistemological considerations
are introduced. They will clarify that the extendible
character of  the human body and mind, although always
actual, can constitute distinct experiences of
integration: one characterised by imagination or the
local awareness of  its relations, and the other defined
by reason, that is, the understanding of  the causal
connections that engender it.  Following this
interpretive strand, I argue, in line with Heidi Ravven
(2002) and Etienne Balibar (1997), that Spinoza’s
theory of  individuation is better comprehended if
examined in association with his epistemology.
The ethical implications that emerge from this
association are also clear. Since Spinoza equates virtue
with a transition to greater self-determination or
activity, I will demonstrate how the forms of
integration engendered by imagination and reason are
also differentiated by their corresponding effects on
the power with which individuals strive to preserve
their existence (this striving being their conatus)7. While
in imaginative systems individuals’ power to act is
decreased, in rational systems it is enhanced as a result
of a more adequate understanding of the connectedness
they experience in Nature. This latter understanding
facilitates the union between individuals, leading to the
formation of  a collective or superior individual in
which each participating individual has its self-
determination enlarged. Since activity is achieved
through the transformation of  inadequate modes of
knowledge into more adequate ones, a virtuous life is
one in which the cultivation of  reason is essential.
Spinoza’s ethics can thus be understood as a process
in which our powers to act or preserve ourselves are
incremented as we unite with others “under the
guidance of reason”8. As his ethical project entails the
expansion of our understanding, I argue that it can be
interpreted as a transindividual process of  education
of  the imagination – each individual constituting a
moment in this process or a determinate level of
integration.
The interpretive position which maintains that
relationality and the expansiveness of  individual
boundaries are essential aspects of  Spinoza’s ontology
is here supported not only for the textual evidence
shown to validate it but also for the challenging
consequences it poses to our traditional forms of
thinking. In conceiving the individual as constitutively
relational, the boundaries that distinguish self and other
gain flexibility and the focus shifts to the very processes
which define individuals. Consequently, ethics is more
clearly viewed as a dynamic system of  sociability which
is conditioned by distinct regimes of  knowledge. The
transition to more rational systems entailed by ethics
can thus be envisaged as a process of  education of
the imagination. Moreover, since the mind is a series
of  ideas corresponding to the series of  states of  its
body (see note 4), an adequate examination of
Spinoza’s epistemology involves his theory of  affects.
The close association between reason and affectivity
as conceived by Spinoza constitutes one of  his most
invaluable philosophical contributions and is also
illuminated by his relational ontology 9.
THE BODY: CHANGING TO CONSERVE
Spinoza asserts that “the mind and the body
are one and the same individual, which is conceived
now under the attribute of  thought, now under the
attribute of extension”10. He also maintains that “the
object of the idea constituting the human mind is the
body” 11 and that “no one will be able to understand it
adequately, or distinctly, unless he first knows
adequately the nature of  our body” 12. Thus, in line
with Spinoza’s prescription and following his own steps
in the Ethics 13, I depart from his notion of  body in
order to understand his conception of  mind and
subsequently his theory of  individual.
In accordance with the physics of  his epoch
and in interlocution with Descartes, Spinoza used a
double vocabulary to speak of  the body. On one hand,
the Ethics presents what Deleuze (2002, p. 128) calls a
kinetic proposition: “Bodies are distinguished from one
another by reason of  motion and rest, speed and
slowness, and not by reason of  substance”14. This ratio
of  movement and rest which distinguishes a body from
others is maintained by the way through which a great
7 “Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to
persevere in its being” (EIII P6).
8 “Men who, from the guidance of  reason, seek their own
advantage – want nothing for themselves which they do not
desire for other men” (EIV P18 S).
9 It is not the purpose of  this article to investigate the
implications of  Spinoza’s relational ontology for his theory of
affects. The reader, however, is invited to draw such connections.
10 EII P21 S.
11 EII P13.
12 EII P13 S.
13 Where in the second part, entitled “of  the nature and origin
of the mind”, Spinoza offers a detailed account of the notion
of  body.
14 EII P13 A2 L1.
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number of  particles or individuals compose the
bodies15. These particles or individuals are extrinsic
parts which are different from one another, and relate
to one another under a characteristic ratio. Thus
movement and rest constitute both the way through
which a body is extrinsically distinguished and the
relations between simple bodies or particles. In
addition to the kinetic definition, ideas referring to an
affective dynamics are also deployed by Spinoza in order
to explain what a body is. Since a body is in constant
contact with other bodies, affecting and being affected
by them, Spinoza considers these affections as a power
which will also define bodies.
Between the kinetic and the dynamic
propositions there is a clear relation of  correspondence.
As the human body is composed by a great number of
parts, and these extensive parts affect each other by
nature, Spinoza concludes that the body will therefore
be affected in a great number of  ways16. In the same
manner that extensive parts belong to a body under a
certain relation, the affections of  a body correspond
to its power to be affected. It is through the motion
and rest of other composite bodies that a body is
affected and determined to motion and rest. The
structure of  a body is hence the composition of  its
relation of  motion and rest inasmuch as that which a
body can do corresponds to the nature and the limits
of  its power to be affected. For the purposes of  this
paper my analysis will concentrate on the kinetic or
mechanic aspects through which the body is defined.
We can see that in both the kinetic and the
dynamic explications the body is neither defined by
its organs, functions or ends nor it is defined as a
substance. For Spinoza, bodies are finite modes or
modifications of  the absolute substance or nature. But
what does it mean to be a mode? The concept of
mode is different from that of substance as it is “that
which is in another through which it is also
conceived”17 – thus a mode is understood as
existentially and conceptually dependent. By stating
that a mode is finite, Spinoza means that it is limited
by other modes of  its kind (bodies limit bodies, and
ideas limit ideas). The finitude of  a mode denotes that
it has no absolute self-sufficiency, that it can only be
comprehended through its relation with substance and
other modes. In short, the concept of  mode indicates
a constitutive opening: bodies (and minds) are not
understood as enclosed or self-contained, but as
constitutively relational.
At a physical level, the fundamental relationality
of modes can be demonstrated through the reciprocity
between constancy and change. This reciprocity
accounts for the conservation of  a body and is
explained by Spinoza through three basic processes:
1. the exchange of  extensive parts, in other words, the
continuous removal of  some parts of  a body while at
the same time parts of  other bodies are incorporated,
maintaining a certain proportion of  motion and rest
invariant18; 2. the change in size of  constituent parts
provided this does not modify the global relation of
motion and rest 19; 3. the modification of  some partial
movement which is compensated by another under
the affection caused by exterior bodies 20. Since for
Spinoza component parts can be understood as both
matter and movement, the exchange of  extensive parts
does not differ from the exchange of  moves. Thus
the constant change of  extensive parts and the
variation of  motion and rest between particles do not
necessarily imply an alteration of the whole - the same
characteristic proportion of  motion and rest can
continue to exist between the mode’s great number
of  parts. Such processes describe a state in which
bodily coherence implies a state of dynamic
equilibrium. It is important to note that the
conservation of  a body is not only compatible with
such continuous changes of  its constituent parts and
their partial motions, but is nothing but this very
process. It is in this sense that Spinoza asserts that the
preservation of  a body is dependent on its
regeneration, which is in turn dependent on the
interactions with a great many other bodies 21.
Hans Jonas (1973, p. 269) notes that with
Spinoza, for the first time in modern thought, the
individual is defined not as a machine that functions
as a closed system, but as a unified plurality sustained
by a sequence of  exchanges with the environment,
and whose form of  union constitutes its only enduring
feature: “substantial identity is thus replaced by formal
identity”. A mode’s form is what distinguishes it from
other modes, it is a determinate configuration that
continues to exist throughout the interactions on which
it depends and that is evidenced by its self-affirming
effort or conatus by which a mode tends to persevere
15 EII P13 Post 1.
16 EII P13 Post 3.
17 EI def D5.
18 EII L4.
19 EII L5.
20 EII L7.
21 EII P13 Post.4.
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in existence. Form, continuity, and relation are,
according to Jonas 22, the three characteristics that
define a mode in Spinoza.
THE EXTENDIBLE INDIVIDUAL
The aspects that have just been presented as
the defining characteristics of  a single existent mode
(namely, its form, continuity and relation) can also be
identified as constitutive of  Nature as a whole. The
totality of  the universe can be considered a single
individual which is defined by the total ratio of  motion
and rest derived from the sum of  all relations. This
conception of  different levels of  individuation is more
explicitly put forward by Spinoza in one of  his letters
to Oldenburg 23, where he demonstrates how the
different particles of  the blood (lymph, chyle, and the
like), each with its distinctive relation, will relate so as
to form the blood under a third relation. The blood,
in turn, is also a composite part of  the human body
under another dominant relation. Spinoza makes clear
that there are objective levels or orders of  magnitude
in Nature which are defined by their interactions or
reciprocal actions. The distinction between whole and
part is thus relative: something which is a part at one
level can be a whole at another level, and conversely.
What defines the whole and the part, however, is
certainly not arbitrary or merely apparent. Its reality is
based on the characteristic proportion of  motion and
rest of  individuals.
If  on the level of  Nature as a whole, all
relations can be combined, on other levels, however,
not every interaction will enhance the individual’s
preservation. Some might in fact modify its defining
ratio of  motion and rest in ways that lead to its
annihilation24. Deleuze (1968, 2002) suggests that the
processes involving the conservation or destruction
of  a finite mode should be described in terms of
composition and decomposition of  its characteristic
relations. Two cases account for these processes: If
two composite bodies meet and the relations which
define each of  them agree, a composition of  such
relations will occur or, in other words, the extensive
parts of  one will adjust to the parts of  the other, thus
generating a third relation which is formed by the
composition of  the preceding relations. In this case, a
body-composite of the original bodies will be
engendered, enhancing their preservation25. However,
it could also be the case that the constitutive relations
of  two bodies that meet do not compose or combine
with one another. Such bodies would then be either
indifferent to each other or one would decompose the
other’s characteristic relation. Thus, using Spinoza’s
example of  the blood composite, if  we consider the
intrusion of  poison whose relations will not agree with
those of  the blood, we will see that the decomposition
or destruction of  the blood’s constitutive relation is
bound to occur. The destruction of  the human body
of  which the blood is a part is the likely outcome of
this alteration of  the characteristic relation of  the body 26.
Andrew Collier (2002) analyses the processes
of  composition or enlargement of  constitutive
relations not only from a corporal perspective. He
argues that “we must consider the body as extendible,
in the sense that the more the body in the narrow
sense interacts with the world about it, the more that
world is to be counted as part of  the person’s inorganic
body” 27. This expansiveness attributed to bodies would
thus solve the problem that emerges from Spinoza’s
definition of the mind as an idea of the body 28.
Considering that for Spinoza “the idea of any mode
in which the human body is affected by external bodies
must involve the nature of  the human body and at the
same time the nature of  the external body” 29, the body
to which an idea corresponds would thus encompass
the external objects with which it relates as its own
parts. Collier asserts that every day experiences attest
to the expansiveness of  our notion of  body beyond
the limits of  our body-actual: to a certain degree,
prosthetics, clothes, vehicles and tools are treated as
part of  us. Some of  these objects largely increase our
power to affect and be affected. In this sense, the
configuration of  the inorganic body depends on how
essential its experienced interactions are. The
alterability of  these exchanges and subsequent
constitution of  the inorganic body are defined by one’s
efforts to persist in existence. Since existence is only
made possible through multiple relations, Collier argues
22 Ibid.,  p. 265.
23 Letter 32.
24 EIV P39 D.
25 EIV P18 S.
26 “Things which bring it about that the human body’s parts
acquire a different proportion of  motion and rest to one another
bring it about that the human body takes on another form, that
is […], that the human body is destroyed, and hence rendered
completely incapable of  being affected in many ways” (EIV
P39 D).
27 Ibid., p. 292.
28 EII P13.
29 EII P16.
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that “the body which the conatus is striving to preserve
is not the body-actual, but something indefinitely larger,
and the more that that conatus succeeds, the larger the
body that it pertains to” 30.
Also allowing extensive enlargements as part
of  the notion of  individual, Alexandre Matheron
(1969, p. 37-61) defines the individual in Spinoza by
its constituent material and formal elements. The
material element refers to the organization of  the
particles that form a body under its invariable
proportion of  motion and rest. The formal element
differentiates between a simple aggregate of  things
and a defined formal structure. It is a unifying formula
which regulates the pattern of  movement and rest
among the individual parts. Moreover, it is the source
of  the individual’s operations and that by which the
individual strives to sustain in existence: its conatus.
Matheron states that an individual in Spinoza is,
therefore, nothing other than the totality of  its parts
(its material element) expressed through a determinate
unifying formula (its formal element). According to
Matheron31, such a definition allows us to consider
many different things as individuals: “the solar system,
the planet earth, a cyclone, a stone, a biological
organism, etc. It equally applies to the total of  the
Universe. […] It is also applicable, among other things,
to political societies”.
EXPANSION CONSTRAINED:
THE ATOMIC INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE
While the focus on the relational constitution
of  individuals has allowed some scholars to argue for
a version of  individuality that admits various levels of
integration, other examiners of  Spinoza’s texts have
argued that there is much evidence to disprove the
notion of  an extendible individual. Robert McShea
(1969), Lee Rice (1990) and Steven Barbone (2001),
for instance, argue, in direct opposition to Matheron,
that the kind of unity that a political society or state
embodies does not constitute a genuine individual in
Spinoza’s terms. Barbone 32 asserts that “the conatus is
a force found ‘inside’ each individual” and an individual
cannot be understood as such if  its unifying force is
explained by external elements that form it. In this
sense, a pile of  stones cannot be considered an
individual given that there is nothing internal to it that
functions as a formal element, no unifying force or
conatus by which it strives to preserve its existence and
operations as a defined conjunction. Barbone also
suggests that we imagine a school of  fish: each
individual fish would congregate with other fish not
because of  the ‘individual’ group, but because by
joining the school each individual fish maximises its
chances of  survival. There is no general conatus or global
effort being exerted to preserve the school’s operations
or existence as a collective.
Furthermore, Barbone utilises Spinoza’s
statement from EII D7 to clarify the distinction
between an individual constituted by a number of
things and a singular thing composed by many
individuals:  “if  a number of  individuals so concur in
one action that together they are all the cause of  one
effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular
thing”. The school of  fish would thus be considered a
thing and not an individual.
Given that an individual for Spinoza is
conceived as both a mind and a body 33, the
philosopher’s references in his political writings and
the Ethics to a collective mind could lead to the
conclusion that states ought to be considered authentic
individuals. Barbone 34 notes, however, that Spinoza’s
statements are counterfactual and hence do not
indicate the reality of  a social mind. In the Ethics, for
example, Spinoza asserts that “man […] can wish for
nothing more helpful to the preservation of  his being
than that all should so agree in all things that the minds
and bodies of  all would compose, as it were [quasi],
one mind and one body”35. Barbone concludes that,
at the most, social entities can be considered
metaphorical or quasi individuals, but not actual
individuals. Additionally, he argues that the distinction
between individuals and quasi individuals is crucial as it
informs the type of  relationship individuals establish
with the state. He suggests that in Spinoza’s
“individualistic and egoistic” philosophy political
institutions are not more important than the individuals
joined in them: “the state exists for the benefit of
each individual who finds him or herself  in it, and it
cannot be the case that an individual exists for the
benefit of the state”36.
30 Ibid., p. 298.
31 Ibid., p. 42.
32 Ibid., p. 100.
33 EII P21 S.
34 Ibid., p. 105.
35 EIV P18 S.
36 Ibid., p. 106.
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ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE EXPANSION
Heidi Ravven (2002) acknowledges the
contradictions found in the Ethics in regard to the
extendible character of  the body and mind and argues
that such an aspect of  Spinoza’s ontology is more
clearly stated and unambiguously maintained by
Spinoza in his Short Treatise, which was written before
the introduction of  the conatus doctrine in the Ethics.
In her article “Spinoza’s individualism reconsidered”, Ravven
claims that the body politic and other social entities
are neither strictly metaphorical (and in that way they
do not supposedly disguise Spinoza’s true atomic
individualism), nor are they natural individuals (which
constitute the way things really are in the order of
nature and explanation). Instead, social entities “convey
the real (yet limited) character of  the local extension
of the body and mind as encompassing their
immediate environment” 37. This limited extension is
true, it is factually existent and thus not metaphorical,
but it is not ultimately adequate either materially or
intellectually for it neither makes manifest nor
apprehends its underlying causal system and
explanation.
Ravven asserts that by focusing on Spinoza’s
physics to explicate the notion of  individual, Collier
and Matheron undermine the fundamental contrast
between an adequate version of  expansion and an
inadequate one. The expansion that involves only the
direct environment, as conceived by these authors,
characterises the inadequate version. In opposition to
Barbone’s claim about the implausibility of  defining
the state as an individual, she also notes that in the
Short Treatise the mind and body politic could be
considered to have the same status that Spinoza grants
to the expansion of the body-mind in and through its
immediate interactions: the expansion is thus real but
inadequate, both in scope and in form.
What would then distinguish an adequate type
of  expansion from an inadequate one? Before we
respond to this question, it is important to recall that
for Spinoza the mind is the idea of  which the body is
the object.38 The mind is hence ongoing thinking,
which is reflective and expressive of  its own body. Its
activity (or the activity that it indeed is) corresponds
to the bodily alterations as the body encounters other
bodies which affect it and change it. The mind is not
a substance, a self  that thinks or a container for thoughts.
The human individual, defined as body and mind, is
therefore its extensive constitution, expressed as a certain
ratio of motion and rest maintained through constant
interactions with other bodies, and its awareness of  each
moment in that interactive process.
Since the body, of  which the mind is an idea,
is continuously affecting and being affected by other
bodies, the mind is the idea not only of  the body to
which it corresponds, but also of  the ongoing relation
between the body and its immediate environment. And
considering that the mind is not a substance or a
container but the very activity of  thinking, as that
relation is made present in its thinking it actually is
that relation. The mind, therefore, is not an isolated
unit set against an external world which it apprehends,
but is the process of encompassing the relation
between body and world in thought.
Ravven39 notes that the thinking or knowledge
which corresponds to the various alterations of
corporal boundaries that result from the body’s
interactions with its immediate environment is
inadequate because the reality that mere awareness
involves is local, partial, and non-causal. In the Short
Treatise, Spinoza maintains that true or adequate
understanding entails a transition from the knowledge
of the immediacy of bodily alterations to the
knowledge of  the extensional and mental causal order.
This second type of  knowledge consists primarily in
the understanding of  the causes that, in Spinoza’s view,
serve as a genetic explanation for things (among them,
the mind and the body). The association between cause
and genetic explanation is made explicit in Spinoza’s
rule of  definition:
The rule is this: that belongs to the nature of  a
thing [the causes] without which the thing can
neither exist nor be understood [and this, we have
been told, is God]: but this is not sufficient; it must
be in such a way that the proposition is always
convertible, viz. that what is said also can neither
be nor be understood without the thing40.
In other words, the causes that engender a
thing define it, that is, belong to its nature materially
and conceptually. The boundaries between a thing, its
material causes and intellectual explanations are thus
dissolved. In understanding the causes of  its mind and
37 Ibid., p. 263
38 EII P13
39 Ibid.
40 KV II Preface [5] of  the Short Treatise, cited in Ravven (2002,
p. 252).
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body, an individual incorporates them, mentally
becoming these causes, which will then operate
immanently as the thinking activity that the mind is.
Deleuze (1968, p. 143) points out that Spinoza’s notion
of  knowledge as genetic explanation finds in Aristotle
its source: “Spinoza does not merely mean that the
effects known depend on causes. He means in
Aristotelian manner that knowledge of  a thing itself
depends on the knowledge of  its cause”. In this sense,
an understanding is adequate insofar as, from those
clearly conceived properties of  a thing, we formulate
a genetic definition from which follow all of  its known
properties. A thing’s definition would thus express its
efficient cause or the genesis of  what it defines; that is
to say that when the thing’s idea expresses its own
cause an adequate idea is formed.
Instead of  reproducing in idea the body’s
experiences of  its own reactions to the immediate
surroundings, the human individual can think of  the
causal extensional order so as to understand the genesis
of  its own particular body as a mode of  extension. In
assimilating this general causal order, the individual’s
mind becomes identical to the substantial order of
thought. As Ravven points out, it is not that one’s
thinking of  reality is then transformed but it is the
very reality of  one’s mind that changes. Furthermore,
in an immanent system, the more adequately a mind
thinks, the more substantial or integrated to the whole
of  nature it becomes, and not only the more of  nature’s
order it mirrors or represents. In absorbing the
determining ideas, the distinctions between what is
internal and what is external to the individual are shown
to be inadequate. However, it is important to note that
as boundaries are reshaped in virtue of  the mind’s
assimilation of  the general order of  causality, the
original limited individual is reconfigured but its
individuality is not extinguished – it is, indeed,
enhanced. In this sense, Rorty (2001, p. 289-290) asserts
that “as ideas become increasingly adequate,
individuation is correspondingly diminished (EIV P35).
To the extent that two individuals have increasingly
adequate ideas, they are decreasingly differentiated”.
Nonetheless, “in diminishing their individuation,
individuals do not diminish their individuality”. Indeed,
individuality – understood as the power of  an individual
to preserve and determine itself  – augments in direct
proportion to the decrease of  individuation, as the
inadequate ideas that individuate are absorbed into the
co-determinative system of  adequate ideas.
The direct association between the expansion
of  individual boundaries that derives from adequate
ideas, on one hand, and the augmentation of  the
individual’s capacity to preserve its existence, on the
other, will be further explored in the following section.
The concepts of  imagination and reason will be
deployed for this purpose.
REASON AS A TRANSINDIVIDUAL SYSTEM OF INTEGRATION
As we have seen, Ravven demonstrates how
the constituent relationality of  human individuals in
Spinoza allows us to conceive their expansiveness or
non-atomic configuration in both cases: 1. when there
is only an immediate awareness of  local interactions
and 2. when the mind assimilates its causes or the
genesis of  its ideas and bodily modifications. In the
first case, imagination is at work. As our bodies retain
traces of  the changes brought about by other bodies,
the mind regards the other bodies as present even
when they no longer exist41. Imagination consists in
the mind regarding bodies in this way. Its inadequacy
resides in the confused perception that an individual
has of  other bodies and its own since it is aware of
their effects on its body but not of the causes; it
functions as if  it reached conclusions without
premises42. In social terms, imagination is fostered by
processes of  affective imitation and successive
identifications (where one recognises the other from
oneself  and oneself  from the other) through which
culturally established ideas are transmitted. Imagination
is thus not only the result of personal and idiosyncratic
experiences, but also of  socio-cultural contents,
inherited conceptions and collective fictions. In the
second case, the individual’s boundaries are
transformed as a result of  reason. The understanding
by an individual’s mind of  non-immediate causal
connections (that, as shown, serve as an explanation
of  its own genesis) constitutes an adequate kind of
knowledge or reason. Reason is governed by common
notions which are universally applied to any object and
also common to all human minds since they are ideas
of  properties which can be found equally in the whole
and in the parts43. When the mind knows according
to reason, it is “determined internally, from the fact
that it regards a number of  things at once, to
41 EII P17 D, C.
42 EII P28 D.
43 EII P40 S.
58
MERÇON, JULIANA. RELATIONALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY IN SPINOZA. P. 51-59.
REVISTA Conatus - FILOSOFIA DE SPINOZA - VOLUME 1 - NÚMERO 2 - DEZEMBRO 2007
understand their agreements, differences, and
oppositions”44.
Etienne Balibar (1997, p. 30-31) suggests that
both imagination and reason are not conceived in
Spinoza as faculties of  the mind, but as transindividual
systems in which different minds are mutually
implicated. Imagination and reason as such are
processes and the individuals involved correspond to
moments in these processes, indicating determinate
levels of  integration. In imaginative systems, individuals
are dominated by inadequate or confused ideas which
oscillate between contrasting illusions: individuals
regard each other as either identical or incompatible.
In rational systems, individuals identify each other as
different but also acknowledge that they share much
in common; they are irreducible to one another, each
having what Spinoza calls a specific ingenium, while being
reciprocally useful or convenientes. In both cases, there
is relationality or transindividuality, but one form being
opposed to the other. This is why Balibar argues that
each kind of  knowledge can thus be considered as a
specific way to establish a connection between the
individual’s preservation and the institution of  a
community.
In stating that there is nothing more useful to
humans than other humans45, Spinoza recommends
the reciprocal use of  each other’s forces. The building
of  a community where there is common understanding
of  nature’s determination, a community in which the
minds and bodies of  all compose, “as it were”, one
single body and one single mind, is seen to enhance
self-conservation46. Thus, reason as a transindividual
system engenders forms of  integration based on
mutual convenience, in which each individual’s striving
to preserve itself  is empowered by others’, building
up a collective or superior individual without
suppressing their self-determination47. On the contrary,
the shared use of  reason can only enlarge each
individual’s capacity to think or know, and accordingly
their power to persevere in existence.
The interdependence between the capacity to
preserve ourselves, our predominant mode of
knowledge and the type of  community in which we
44 EII P29 S.
45 EIV P18 S.
46 EIV P18 S.
47 Various passages of  the Ethics convey the idea that relationships
based on individuals’ common nature form a superior individual
without diminishing their capacity to preserve their existence:
EIV P38-39; EIV P2-7; EIV P29-31; EIVP38-40.
partake indicates how ontology, epistemology, politics
and ethics are closely related in Spinoza’s philosophy.
Nevertheless, the expansion of  our powers to act, and
subsequently the exercise of  reason and harmonious
forms of  sociability, is not to be viewed as necessarily
progressive. Since, according to Spinoza, inadequate
ideas will never cease to constitute human experience,
ethics is better understood not as a linear process
towards more rational individuals and societies. The
inextricable relation between knowledge and affectivity
largely accounts for the complexities of  the ethical
process – a never ending process of  education of  our
imagination and desire.
k k k
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